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LOOKING FOR A SILVER LINING: HOW THE
COVID-1 PANDEMIC FORCES NEW YORK TO
RECKON WITH ITS AFFORDABLE HOUSING
CRISIS
ABSTRACT
Since the Great Depression, the United States government has failed to
find an adequate remedy to a nationwide housing shortage amongst low- and
moderate-income individuals and families. The COVID-19 public health
crisis has exacerbated this ongoing, nation-wide housing crisis, and has
highlighted the racial inequities present in our housing market. Furthermore,
it has pushed New York State’s residential housing market into a uniquely
precarious position. Dramatic legislation is required at the state level to
address the housing crisis caused by the massive growth in income-insecure
and housing-insecure individuals that resulted from the pandemic, as well as
the widespread departure of high-earning individuals out of the city. Despite
the recent federal and state-wide moratoriums on evictions, further action is
needed at the state level to address pernicious, exclusionary practices
creating these housing shortages. By following the leads of other
jurisdictions attempting to remedy their own housing crises, New York State
should preempt local government restrictions on new developments, and
further incentivize property owners to convert their housing into affordable
units. Given the number of vacant market-rate units in New York City as well
as the ongoing suburban housing boom, the real estate market is particularly
ripe for New York State to remedy longstanding inequities and injustices.
INTRODUCTION
“Fair housing for all—all human beings who live in this country—is now
part of the American way of life.”1
New York State has long been at the center of the conversation around
the failures of the United States’ housing system.2 In particular, New York
City has a long, storied history of enacting some of the largest and most
progressive housing measures in the nation. 3 These measures, while
significant in their scale and their ideology, have inadequately met the city’s

1. See VICKI BEEN, DEP’T FOR HOUSING AND ECON. DEV., WHERE WE LIVE NYC 4 (2020)
(quoting Lyndon B. Johnson’s proclamation after he enacted the Fair Housing Act of 1968).
2. Nicholas Dagen Bloom & Matthew Gordon Lasner, AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN NEW YORK:
THE PEOPLE, PLACES AND POLICIES THAT TRANSFORMED A CITY 1–8 (2016) (discussing the stark
contrast between New York’s crowded, substandard, costly housing, and the “aggressive responses
by reformers” working to fix these conditions).
3. Id. at 6–8.
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housing demand, 4 and in some instances actually perpetuated New York
State’s history of segregation. 5 That history of economic and racial
segregation dates back to the post-war suburban construction boom,6 and the
racially-restrictive covenants included in these newly-developed suburbs.7
Recently, judiciaries and legislatures at the state and local level have
attempted to address housing discrimination within their jurisdictions. 8
However, these measures have largely been performative and fail to
adequately address the problem.
The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has only further exacerbated these
inequalities. 9 While recent federal and state legislation provides low and
middle-class residents with the tools to cope with certain short-term impacts
of COVID-19, 10 the various economic effects of the pandemic are
nevertheless propelling hundreds of thousands of low-income New Yorkers
into debt and housing insecurity. 11 Additionally, further compounding the

4. Luis Ferré-Sadurní, The Rise and Fall of New York Public Housing: An Oral History, N.Y.
TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/25/nyregion/new-york-citypublic-housing-history.html.
5. See, e.g., Brian Purnell & Jeanne Theoharis, How New York City Became the Capital of the
Jim Crow North, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/08/23/how-new-york-city-became-the-capital-of-the-jimcrow-north/.html; Joy Resmovits, The Nation’s Most Segregated Schools Aren’t Where You Think
They’d Be, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 26, 2014, 11:01 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/newyork-schools-segregated_n_5034455; Sally Goldenberg, 50 years after Fair Housing Act, New York
City still struggles with residential segregation, POLITICO (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2018/04/23/50-years-after-fair-housingact-new-york-city-still-struggles-with-residential-segregation-376170.
6. See Purnell & Theoharis, supra note 5; see also Bruce Lambert, Rethinking the Nation’s
First Suburb, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/25/nyregion/
nyregionspecial2/rethinking-the-nations-first-suburb.html.
7. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA at 78 (2017) (examining the lasting social and
economic effects of the post-war housing boom, and the role government policies played in both
establishing and exacerbating segregation).
8. U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cty., N.Y., 712 F.3d
761, 767-770 (2d Cir. 2013) (employing the federal False Claims Act to enforce a County’s
previously agreed-to obligation to develop affordable housing); Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of
Nassau, 819 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that a local municipality’s zoning ordinance violated
the disparate-treatment provision of the Federal Housing Authority); Daniel Hampton, Nassau
Unveils New Anti-Housing Discrimination Plan, PATCH (Nov. 22, 2019), https://patch.com/newyork/mineola/nassau-unveils-new-anti-housing-discrimination-plan.
9. Oksana Mironova & Thomas J. Waters, A sudden shock to an overburdened system: NYC
housing & COVID-19, CSSNY (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.cssny.org/news/entry/nyc-housingcovid-19.
10. See, e.g., Coronavirus Economic Stabilization (CARES Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 9057, 9058
(2020) (providing for a temporary moratorium on eviction filings and providing for forbearance of
residential mortgage loan payments for multifamily properties with federally backed loans).
11. CUNY GRADUATE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH AND HEALTH POLICY, COVID-19 SURVEY OF
NEW YORK CITY RESIDENTS (2020).
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issue are the thousands of wealthy New Yorkers who fled the city 12 and
created a suburban housing boom in the “outer-boroughs” of New York.13
This inflated the real estate market,14 and further segregated New York City’s
suburbs.15
Despite millions of New Yorkers feeling the pandemic’s impact,16 it also
provides the state with a unique opportunity to remedy long-standing
inequities in the housing market. As federal funding for existing affordable
housing programs continues to dwindle each year, 17 the New York State
legislature should look to other jurisdictions for the creative solutions needed
to craft a proactive remedy for the state’s housing needs. Just as the Great
Depression caused lawmakers to expand the government’s role in the
provision and financing of housing, the combined influence of the Black
Lives Matter movement and the economic impact of the COVID-19
pandemic has forced lawmakers to reconsider the government’s role in
providing for the housing needs of low-income Americans.
In Part I, this Note will examine the history of the housing crisis in the
United States, and how actions taken by federal, state, and local governments
have worked to create our current, flawed system. Part II examines the
economic effects of COVID-19, the government’s response, and the
suburban housing boom that consequently occurred. Next, Part III details
specific remedies that other states and municipalities instituted to mitigate
the housing crisis and the positive steps that New York has taken. Lastly, Part
IV will propose certain measures the New York legislature must take to
adequately combat both the effects of COVID-19 and the long-standing
inequities present in the current housing system.

12. See, e.g., Joshua Chaffin, New York City Lite: after coronavirus, will business flock to the
suburbs?, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/87bf5383-dbcb-48d6-928f18371c55425b.
13. Graham Rapier, Sales of pricey New York City apartments plunge as the suburbs become
cool again, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 8, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/nyc-apartment-salesplunge-coronavirus-new-york-exodus-suburbs-connecticut-2020-8; Lisa Prevost, 5 Ways the
Coronavirus Has Changed Suburban Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/17/realestate/coronavirus-suburbs-real-estate.html. In this Note,
the “outer-boroughs” refers to Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester Counties.
14. Graham Rapier, Sales of pricey New York City apartments plunge as the suburbs become
cool again, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 8, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/nyc-apartment-salesplunge-coronavirus-new-york-exodus-suburbs-connecticut-2020-8.
15. Talmon Joseph Smith, New York is Dead … to Whom? We’ve Seen New York’s White Flight
Before, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2020/08/
new-york-dead-to-whom/615673/.
16. See Mironova & Waters, supra note 9; see also, The Coronavirus in New York, by the
numbers, CITY & STATE N.Y. (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/politics
/new-york-state/new-coronavirus-numbers.html.
17. See NATIONAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING COALITION, CHANGING PRIORITIES: THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING ASSISTANCE, 1976–2007, (2002), https://nlihc.org/library/other/
periodic/changing-priorities-1976-2007.
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I. THE HISTORY OF ZONING: INVISIBLE LINES THAT DIVIDE
OUR NEIGHBORHOODS
In 1926, the United States Supreme Court presided over two landmark
cases that forever altered the racial composition of American cities and
suburbs.18 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court ruled
that local governments hold the power to implement zoning ordinances
through their police power so long as the ordinance serves the public’s best
interest. 19 While not explicitly racial in their description, the local
governments of upper-class municipalities have used the powers granted to
them under Euclid to implement zoning ordinances that exclude low-income
residents 20 and ultimately maintain racial segregation. 21 In Corrigan v.
Buckley, the Supreme Court authorized the use of racially-restrictive
covenants in housing deeds.22 During a period of unprecedented government
intervention in the housing market, local governments, under Euclid
excluded low-income residents from moving in. 23 Additionally, under
Corrigan, individual citizens dictated the future owners of their homes based
on race. While Corrigan was overturned 22 years later,24 private, raciallyrestrictive agreements remained in effect until the Fair Housing Act of 1968
made them unlawful.25
The combined effect of these two Supreme Court decisions was to
establish predominantly white towns, populated with single-family homes,26
that possessed the power to prevent the development of any multi-family
dwellings, including apartments, duplexes, and additional dwelling units

18. See CLEMENT VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP AND THE
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 17-18, 51-52 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959)
(detailing the role racially-restrictive covenants, and Corrigan, played in establishing our segregated
cities and suburbs); see generally Rothstein, supra note 7 (discussing the effects of Euclid and
racially-restrictive covenants on the development of American suburbs).
19. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (declaring that apartment
houses in the suburbs are parasites and are attempting to take advantage of the attractions that singlefamily homes provide).
20. See, e.g., John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption Amid a Housing
Crisis, 60 B.C. L. REV. 823, 827 (2019); Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Walls We Won’t Tear Down,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/opinion/sunday/zoning-lawssegregation-income.html.
21. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 7, at 53.
22. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
23. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 7, at 52, 53.
24. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (overturning Corrigan v. Buckley, and the finding
the judicial enforcement of racially-restrictive covenants to be unconstitutional).
25. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
26. See generally Sarah Shoenfeld & Mara Cherkasky, ‘A Strictly White Residential Section’:
The Rise and Demise of Racially Restrictive Covenants in Bloomingdale, D.C. POLICY CENTER
(Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.dcpolicycenter.org/publications/racially-restrictive-covenantsbloomingdale/ (detailing the long term effects Corrigan v. Buckley, and racially-restrictive
covenants had on Washington D.C.).
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(ADU). 27 While racially exclusive covenants have since been deemed
unconstitutional,28 their segregating effects are still evident today.29 Over the
past forty years, home values increased in the United States by 145%.30 For
those who owned homes then, this increase has expanded their wealth by
approximately a third.31 For those who were unable to purchase homes before
1980, due to racially discriminatory policies and practices, “buying one’s first
home has become increasingly burdensome.” 32 Furthermore, while the
average appraised home value in white neighborhoods rose by $73,000, the
average appraised value of homes in Black and Latinx neighborhoods fell by
$22,000.33
A. NEW YORK CITY HOUSING: ZONING’S POWERFUL EFFECT ON
DEVELOPMENT
Common law has long recognized the right of local communities to
challenge the developments of certain uses of property by deeming them
undesirable and a nuisance. 34 In New York, communities have used this
power to prevent the development of multi-family housing, and thus to
maintain the racial and economic segregation of a past era.35 In Euclid, the
Supreme Court held that a local government may “forbid the erection of a
building of a particular kind or for a particular use … by considering it in
connection with the circumstances and the locality.” 36 The decision
established the now-customary requirement that a zoning ordinance bears a
“substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.”37 In New York City, zoning laws are required to be undertaken “in
27. See generally Rothstein, supra note 7, at 52–54 (discussing the wide range of methods local
governments used to enforce their police power); see Kahlenberg, supra note 20.
28. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
29. Laurie Goodman, Jun Zhu & Rolf Pendall, Are gains in black homeownership history?, URB.
INST. (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/are-gains-black-homeownership-history
(detailing the effects of the modern housing crisis on the black community).
30. See Brentin Mock, A Neighborhood’s Race Affects Home Values More Now Than in 1980,
CITYLAB (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-21/race-gap-inhome-appraisals-has-doubled-since-1980?sref=OH7mKQXK; see also, Michela Zonta, Racial
Disparities in Home Appreciation, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 15, 2019), https://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/07/15/469838/racial-disparities-homeappreciation/.
31. See Mock, supra note 30.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See generally PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS (Matthew Bender,
1997) (cataloguing local zoning laws across the nation).
35. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Housing Bias Outlasts Ruling in a Long Island Village, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/24/nyregion/housing-bias-outlasts-ruling-in-along-island-village.html (detailing how Garden City, a suburb of New York City, used its local
authority to illegally block the development of multifamily housing, and the potential for minorities
to move into the community).
36. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
37. Id. at 394.
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accord with a well-considered plan” 38 or “in accordance with a
comprehensive plan.” 39 A typical zoning commission contains numerous
layers of oversight to ensure the legality of their proposals.40 However, there
is clear evidence that zoning laws are often impermissibly used to the
detriment of the overall public.41 Because of this, zoning regulations have
been at the center of endless disputes in New York City since their
inception.42 Despite the positive connotation of requiring a zoning ordinance
to be for the “general welfare,” in the near-century since Euclid, a substantial
amount of economic43 and legal literature44 has been written, decrying the
“pernicious effects that restrictive land use regulations” have on the
affordability and availability of decent housing.45
Zoning ordinances in the United States began in 1916 with New York
City’s Zoning Resolution.46 In an attempt to address overcrowding in lower
Manhattan, health and safety hazards posed by the growing height of
buildings,47 and the blurred boundary between residential and manufacturing
spaces, 48 the city imposed certain height and setback requirements, and it
banned commercial development from newly-established residential areas.49
The resolution led to the widespread embrace of low-rise buildings and
plazas, particularly in the residential neighborhoods that had secured
exclusionary zoning ordinances.50
As New York City implemented its first governmental restrictions on real
estate development, a greater need for government intervention developed
38. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(25) (McKinney 2020).
39. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 263 (McKinney 2020).
40. See generally EDWARD M. BASSETT, ZONING: THE LAWS, ADMINISTRATION, AND COURT
DECISIONS DURING THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS (1940) (detailing the basic procedural steps of
implementing a zoning ordinance); James A. Coon, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF STATE, ZONING AND THE
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 3 (1999).
41. See Infranca, supra note 20, 823-27 (cataloguing the history of zoning ordinances in
America, and their effects on housing development).
42. See Cait Etherington, Understanding How 100 Years of Zoning Has Shaped New York City,
CITYREALTY (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.cityrealty.com/nyc/market-insight/features/future-nyc/
understanding-how-100-years-zoning-has-shaped-new-york-city/7063; see, e.g., Matter of Hart v.
Town Bd. of Town of Huntington, 980 N.Y.S.2d 128 (N.Y. App. Div., 2nd Dept., 2014).
43. See generally, e.g., Joseph Gyourko et al., A New Measure of the Local Regulatory
Environment for Housing Markets: The Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index, 45 URB.
STUD. 693 (2008) (analyzing regulations on housing markets in different U.S. jurisdictions).
44. See, e.g., Infranca, supra note 20; Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Balancing the
“Zoning Budget,” 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81 (2011).
45. See Infranca, supra note 20, at 830.
46. See Sara Cottle, A comprehensive guide to NYC zoning: Past, present and future, MILROSE
CONSULTANTS (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.milrose.com/insights/-nyc-zoning-history
47. Id.; see also Etherington, supra note 42.
48. See Etherington, supra note 42.
49. David W. Dunlap, Zoning Arrived 100 Years Ago. It Changed New York City Forever. N.Y.
TIMES (July 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/26/nyregion/new-yorks-first-zoningresolution-which-brought-order-to-a-chaotic-building-boom-turns-100.html?_r=0. A setback is the
minimum distance which a building must be set back from a street.
50. Id.
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with the onset of the Great Depression and the collapse of the United States’
housing market.51 In 1929, following the stock market crash, the construction
of new homes came to a halt, repairs of rundown housing went unfinished,
and slums began expanding throughout all major American cities.52 Congress
responded by passing measures intended to relieve distressed homeowners
and the banks that had financed the acquisition of these homes. This included
legislation like the Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, which allowed
government-sponsored banks to assist in home financing and community
lending, and the National Housing Act of 1934, which created the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA).53
The purpose of the FHA was to encourage lending, protect private
lenders from losses by insuring their mortgages, and protect loan recipients
by regulating interest rates and down-payment requirements. 54 Before the
FHA, most mortgages were short-term, with no amortization, and were
therefore inaccessible to working-class families. 55 With the FHA, the
government slowed the rates of homeowner defaults56 and kickstarted the
development of new housing. 57 The FHA-insured lending increased the
number of Americans who could afford down payments and monthly
mortgage payments by providing them mortgages with term lengths of
twenty or more years, thus expanding the market for single-family homes.58
However, these benefits were restricted to white Americans.59
As federally-funded and federally-subsidized suburbs developed around
the country, black people were blocked out as the developers used raciallyrestrictive covenants in the housing deeds to exclude nonwhites. 60
Furthermore, the federal government restricted these developments by not
providing loans to the black community.61 As these programs revived the
housing market on an exclusionary basis, the federal government required
appraisers to give better property and zoning ratings to neighborhoods that
avoided “infiltration by inharmonious racial or nationality groups.” 62
51. ALBERT MONROE, HOW THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION AFFECTS
HOMEOWNERSHIP 1–6 (Harv. Univ. Press 2001).
52. See generally Rothstein, supra note 7, at 18–25 (detailing the Great Depressions’ effect on
the housing market).
53. See Monroe, supra note 51.
54. 1934: Federal Housing Administration Created, BOS. FAIR HOUS. ORG., https://www.
bostonfairhousing.org/timeline/1934-FHA.html, (last visited Dec. 27, 2020).
55. See Monroe, supra note 51.
56. See John Griffith, The Federal Housing Administration Saved the Housing Market, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 11, 2012, 3:04 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues
/economy/reports/2012/10/11/40824/the-federal-housing-administration-saved-the-housingmarket/.
57. See Rothstein, supra note 7, at 9, 10.
58. See Monroe, supra note 51.
59. See generally Rothstein, supra note 7, at 9.
60. Id. at 76–79.
61. Id. at 25–29.
62. Id. at 65 (quoting the FHA’s underwriting manual).
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Between 1934 and 1968, Black Americans received only 2% of all federally
insured home loans.63 At the same time, New York City’s Housing Authority
segregated its own housing developments. 64 With homeownership
recognized today as Americans’ predominant source of financial security and
wealth accumulation,65 these policies have acted as one of the foundations
for the wealth divide between white and Black Americans. 66 While these
programs were instrumental in establishing the guidelines for government
involvement in housing, their legacy of racial segregation endures.67
B. RECENT STEPS TO ALLEVIATE THE CRISIS
Scholars have noted the negative effects land-use regulations have on the
general welfare of the public, including on economic and social mobility,68
racial integration, 69 economic growth, 70 education, 71 and a variety of
environmental concerns.72 In New York City, recent mayoral administrations
have each attempted to address the negative effects of zoning through their
own housing initiatives.73 However, many felt that these housing programs
failed to address the city’s most pressing housing needs, and, despite iterative

63. See Thomas W. Hanchett, The Other ‘Subsidized Housing’: Federal Aid to Suburbanization,
1940’s – 1960’s, PENN. ST. UNIV. PRESS 163, 166 (2000).
64. See NICHOLAS DAGEN BLOOM & MATTHEW GORDON LASNER, AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN
NEW YORK: THE PEOPLE, PLACES AND POLICIES THAT TRANSFORMED A CITY 1437 (2016)
(finding that NYCHA segregated their first two developments based on race).
65. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV., WEALTH ACCUMULATION AND
HOMEOWNERSHIP: EVIDENCE FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS (2004).
66. See Courtney Connley, Why the homeownership gap between White and Black Americans
is larger today than it was over 50 years ago, CNBC (Aug. 21. 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/21/why-the-homeownership-gap-between-white-and-blackamericans-is-larger-today-than-it-was-over-50-years-ago.html.
67. See Richard Rothstein, The Making of Ferguson, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Oct. 15, 2014),
https://www.epi.org/publication/making-ferguson/.
68. Alana Semuels, The Barriers Stopping Poor People from Moving to Better Jobs, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/geographicmobility-and-housing/542439/.
69. Jonathan T. Rothwell, Racial Enclaves and Density Zoning: The Institutionalized
Segregation of Racial Minorities in the United States, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 290, 291 (2011)
70. See, e.g., Space and the City, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015), https://www.economist.
com/leaders/2015/04/04/space-and-the-city.
71. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 624 (2002); see also Richard
Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1829 (2003).
72. See, e.g., Edward Glaeser, Reforming Land Use Regulations, BROOKINGS INST. 1, 5–6 (Apr.
24, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/reforming-land-use-regulations/; see also John S.
Jacob & Ricardo Lopez, Is Denser Greener? An Evaluation of Higher Density Development as an
Urban Stormwater-Quality Best Management Practice, 45 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 687,
688 (2009).
73. See, e.g., Diane Luebs, Mandatory Inclusionary Housing Program: Summary of New Zoning
Regulations, MILROSE CONSULTANTS (July 25, 2016), https://www.milrose.com
/insights/mandatory-inclusionary-housing-program-summary-of-new-zoning-regulations (detailing
the specifics of DeBlasio’s mandatory inclusionary housing program).
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attempts at improving these policies, they remain a collection of individual
programs that lack any cohesive strategy.74
Various mayoral administrations have implemented their own affordable
housing programs over the years, each with varying degrees of success.
However, collectively, these programs have failed to address the racial
segregation at the heart of New York City’s housing infrastructure. In 1985,
Mayor Ed Koch implemented the Ten-Year Plan for Housing, which spanned
more than 100 programs and was based around three policy tools: (1) provide
low-interest loans for homeowners to make upgrades and repairs, (2) provide
subsidies for new construction projects, predominantly through publicprivate partnerships, and (3) use community development corporations and
nonprofits to address the needs of the poor in New York City.75 Koch utilized
several sources to finance his plan, including the Housing Development
Corporation, a public benefit corporation that issues bonds to raise capital for
affordable housing developments. 76 Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s plan,
which ran from 2003–2014, was devised as a partnership between nonprofits,
public agencies, and the private sector. 77 Using a mixture of public and
private financing, Koch and Bloomberg’s plans together created 332,106 new
units.78 While Bloomberg often touted his program as a series of rezonings
for developers to add more housing, studies indicate the number of
downzones (reductions in density) outnumbered upzones (increasing allowed
density) during his administration.79 In fact, two-thirds of the units developed
under Bloomberg were not affordable to low-income individuals and
families.80
In 2016, Mayor Bill De Blasio enacted his Mandatory Inclusionary
Housing (MIH) program to succeed Bloomberg’s expanded Voluntary

74. See Elizabeth J. Mueller & Alex Schwartz, Reversing the Tide: Will State and Local
Governments House the Poor as Federal Direct Subsidies Decline?, 74 J. OF THE AM. PLAN. ASS’N.
122–135 (2008); see also Ed Sullivan & Karin Power, Coming Affordable Housing Challenges for
Municipalities After the Great Recession, 21 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., 297 (2013).
75. FURMAN CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE & URB. POL’Y, HOUSING POLICY IN NEW YORK CITY:
A BRIEF HISTORY 3–6 (2016).
76. Bakry Elmedni, The Mirage of Housing Affordability: An Analysis of Affordable Housing
Plans in New York City, 8 SAGE OPEN at 2 (2018).
77. See Press Release, Mayors Office, City will reach 160,000 affordable units by year’s end
(Dec. 21, 2013), https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/428-13/mayor-bloomberg-citywill-reach-160-000-units-affordable-housing-financed-under-new/#/0.
78. FURMAN CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, HOUSING POLICY IN NEW YORK
CITY: A BRIEF HISTORY 3–6 (2016).
79. See Daniel Hertz, The politics of grand housing bargains: NYC, CITY OBSERVATORY (2016)
https://cityobservatory.org/the-politics-of-grand-housing-bargains-nyc/.
80. See ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, INC., AN EVALUATION OF THE
BLOOMBERG HOUSING PROGRAM & RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN AFFORDABLE HOUSING
POLICY (2012).
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Inclusionary Housing program. 81 MIH allowed an area to be rezoned to
permit more housing so long as the private developers agreed to include a
certain percentage of affordable units.82 For example, 190 blocks of East New
York, Cypress Hills, and Ocean Hill were rezoned to allow for 2,500 new
units of housing, including 1,300 affordable units.83 While the program has
been praised for its vision and attempt to remedy the city’s housing situation,
its effects have been limited by powerful neighborhood coalitions opposing
rezoning within their districts.84 This well-funded, well-organized opposition
and the powerful city council members representing them, have historically
restricted these initiatives to specific areas of New York City and New York
State.85 This limited implementation often leads to overcrowding and further
segregation of low-income neighborhoods.
Recently, non-profit organizations have successfully remedied some
housing inequities in federal and state courts. 86 For example, in AntiDiscrimination Center v. Westchester County, the Anti-Discrimination
Center sued Westchester for failing to adequately address the fair housing
issue in its overwhelmingly white villages and towns, while still collecting
millions of dollars a year in federal housing aid.87 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit ultimately found that the county had misrepresented
its desegregation efforts and entered a consent decree calling for Westchester
to build or acquire 750 units of affordable housing, 630 of which were to go
in towns where Black residents were less than 3% of the population.88 As a
result, the federal government is withholding further federal housing aid until
81. See ERIC KOBER, De Blasio’s Mandatory Inclusionary Housing Program: What is Wrong,
and How It Can Be Made Right, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE (2020), https://www.manhattaninstitute.org/deblasios-mandatory-inclusionary-housing-program.
82. Id.
83. See Sadef Ali Kully, Six Down, One to Go: Where de Blasio’s Rezonings Stand, CITY LIMITS
(Sept.
10,
2020),
https://citylimits.org/2020/09/10/six-down-one-to-go-where-de-blasiosrezonings-stand/.
84. See Kober, supra note 81; see also, Benjamin Schneider, CityLab University: Inclusionary
Zoning, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB, (July 17, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201807-17/inclusionary-zoning-everything-you-need-to-know.
85. See Pablo Zevallos, To increase racial justice, upzone for equity, CITY & STATE N.Y. (July
23, 2020), https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/opinion/commentary/increase-racial-justiceupzone-equity.html (advocating for policy initiatives, in the era of Black Lives Matter, that would
desegregate New York); see also John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 91, 92 (2014) (detailing how exclusionary zoning regulations that were once typical for
suburbs are now employed to restrict new developments in cities).
86. See In Landmark Settlement, Nassau County Will Implement Affordable Housing Plan
Aimed At Ending Residential Segregation, YAHOO FIN. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com
/news/landmark-settlement-nassau-county-implement-043509696.html (detailing the settlement
between Nassau County and affordable housing organizations, claiming that Nassau forced
affordable housing developments exclusively into black communities).
87. U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cty., N.Y., 712 F.3d
761 (2d Cir. 2013).
88. Id.; see Appeals Court Rules Westchester County Violated Consent Decree, NAT’L LOW
INCOME HOUS. COALITION (Apr. 12, 2013), https://nlihc.org/resource/appeals-court-ruleswestchester-county-violated-consent-decree.
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Westchester can establish the steps it has taken to affirmatively further fair
housing in conformity with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing
Act. 89 Six years after the case, the Obama administration introduced the
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing regulation, which required local
governments to identify patterns of racial discrimination and to offer their
plans to rectify them.90 This case provides a clear guide for how counties can
enforce provisions of the Fair Housing Act on their local municipalities, as
well as how the state government can incentivize further development of
affordable housing units. There have also been recent commitments by local
legislators outside the city that indicate a willingness to combat the status
quo.91 While these decisions and commitments by local governments have
not been fully implemented, they indicate a potential push throughout New
York State to make large-scale commitments to the development of
affordable housing.
II. EXACERBATING EFFECTS OF COVID-1 ON NEW YORK
CITY HOUSING
As the housing crisis worsened throughout the 21st Century,92 during and
after the Great Recession,93 city and State authorities continued their attempts
to address the crisis.94 While there are many critics of the various Mayoral
administrations’ housing initiatives,95 these were all clear attempts to address
89. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2)).
90. See Julia Hirschfeld & Binyamin Appelbaum, Obama Unveils Stricter Rules Against
Segregation in Housing, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/us/hudissuing-new-rules-to-fight-segregation.html; see also Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80
Fed. Reg. 136 (July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, et al).
91. See Daniel Hampton, Nassau Unveils New Anti-Housing Discrimination Plan, PATCH (Nov.
22, 2019), https://patch.com/new-york/mineola/nassau-unveils-new-anti-housing-discriminationplan (following a report that Long Island real estate agents intentionally promote segregation,
Nassau County Executive Laura Curran implemented county-wide measures intended to combat
segregation and Long Island’s affordable housing crisis).
92. Becky Sullivan & Ari Shapiro, 10 Years After Housing Crisis: A Realtor, A Renter, Starting
Over, Staying Put, NPR (Apr. 28, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/28/603678259/10-yearsafter-housing-crisis-a-realtor-a-renter-starting-over-staying-put.
93. See Michelle Lerner, 10 years later: How the housing market has changed since the crash,
WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2018) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/10/04/
feature/10-years-later-how-the-housing-market-has-changed-since-the-crash/; see also Gillian B.
White, The Recession’s Racial Slant, THE ATLANTIC (June 24, 2015), https://www.
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/black-recession-housing-race/396725/ (discussing the
disparate effects the 2008 Recession had on African American homeownership).
94. See generally, Your Home NYC, NYC HOUSING, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/housing/
index.page (last visited Mar. 7, 2021) (detailing the myriad efforts by New York City and State
authorities to remedy the housing crisis); see also Caroline Spivack, As NYC neighborhoods push
back against rezonings, de Blasio’s signature housing policy is threatened, CURBED (Mar. 2, 2020),
https://ny.curbed.com/2020/2/6/21123983/nyc-affordable-housing-rezoning-bill-de-blasio.
95. See Caroline Spivack, As NYC neighborhoods push back against rezonings, de Blasio’s
signature housing policy is threatened, CURBED (Mar. 2, 2020), https://ny.curbed.com/2020/
2/6/21123983/nyc-affordable-housing-rezoning-bill-de-blasio (detailing De Blasio’s failed
rezoning attempts, and the neighborhoods that have prevented them).
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the crisis that the City was facing.96 Unfortunately, any progress the city has
made in addressing its housing crisis has been stunted by the pandemic and
its effects on low-income renters and the construction of new, affordable
units.
A. RENTERS AND LOW-INCOME RESIDENTS BEAR THE BRUNT
COVID-19 has further brought to light the structural racism that
underlies our housing market, and since the pandemic’s onset, it has become
clear that New York City’s renters and landlords have been pushed to the
precipice. Before the pandemic, the city had 312,000 renter households who
worked, did not receive federal housing assistance, and had income levels
two times lower than the poverty level. 97 Since the beginning of the
pandemic, tens of millions of Americans have lost their jobs,98 with millions
more suffering loss of income due to either shortened hours or furlough.99
These effects have not been equitably distributed across economic and racial
classes, with the brunt of the pandemic’s economic effects being felt by poor
people and people of color.100
These effects include higher infection and mortality rates amongst Black
and Hispanic Americans,101 and more job losses than white households.102
The roots of these disparities stem from lower incomes, poor quality or

96. See Valeria Ricciulli, City creates record number of affordable homes for vulnerable New
Yorkers,
but
critics
remain
skeptical,
CURBED
(Aug.
1,
2019),
https://ny.curbed.com/2019/8/1/20748687/bill-de-blasio-nyc-affordable-housing-data-2019/.
97. The poverty line is considered an income of $41,000 for a family of three. Low-income
residents of New York were, in these instances referenced, earning 200% below this line. See
Mironova & Waters, supra note 9.
98. See Eric Morath, How Many U.S. Workers Have Lost Jobs During Coronavirus Pandemic?
There Are Several Ways to Count, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/howmany-u-s-workers-have-lost-jobs-during-coronavirus-pandemic-there-are-several-ways-to-count11591176601.
99. See Patrick McGeehan, A Million Jobs Lost: A ‘Heart Attack’ for the N.Y.C. Economy, N.Y.
TIMES (July 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/nyregion/nyc-unemployment.html.
100. See, e.g., Nichole Tucker, COVID-19 Death Toll in NYC Calls Attention to Racial
Disparities, TARGETED ONCOLOGY (July 2, 2020), https://www.targetedonc.com/view/covid-19death-toll-in-nyc-calls-attention-to-racial-disparities (reflecting the pandemic’s effects through the
second and third weeks of March), https://www.targetedonc.com/view/covid-19-death-toll-in-nyccalls-attention-to-racial-disparities; see also CUNY GRADUATE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH AND
HEALTH POL’Y, WORKING TO ADDRESS COVID-19 (2020), https://sph.cuny.edu/research/covid19-tracking-survey/september/.
101. See CUNY GRADUATE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH AND HEALTH POL’Y, WORKING TO ADDRESS
COVID-19 (2020), https://sph.cuny.edu/research/covid-19-tracking-survey/september/; see also
Gina Kolata, Social Inequities Explain Racial Gaps in Pandemic, Studies Find, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
9, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/health/coronavirus-black-hispanic.html.
102. Steven Brown, The COVID-19 Crisis Continues to Have Uneven Economic Impact by Race
and Ethnicity, URB. INST. (July 1, 2020), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/covid-19-crisiscontinues-have-uneven-economic-impact-race-and-ethnicity
(detailing
the
pandemic’s
disproportionate impact on African Americans).
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overcrowded housing, and inadequate access to preventive medical care.103
A study conducted by the CUNY Graduate School of Public Health and
Health Policy shows that 34% of New Yorkers earning under $50,000
reported that they, or someone in their household, had lost their job as a result
of the pandemic.104 Furthermore, New York City did not have certain race
and ethnicity data early on in the pandemic,105 meaning the racial disparities
may be higher than known.106 Despite the well-publicized drop in New York
City rents,107 the average rent is still nearly two times the national average.108
Additionally, with unemployment in New York City nearly twice the national
average,109 and over two-thirds of city residents renting their homes,110 New
York City’s housing market remains in a precarious position.
A widespread inability of tenants to pay rent precipitates an inability for
property owners to pay their mortgages. 111 According to a study by the
Community Housing Improvement Program (CHIP), a quarter of New York
City’s renters have not paid rent since March. 112 Even starker, the
delinquency rate on large commercial loans tied to real estate in the United

103. See David Cruz, St. Barnabas Hospital’s ER Is A “War Zone” As Bronx Coronavirus
Hospitalization Rates Soar, GOTHAMIST (Apr. 7, 2020), https://gothamist.com/news/st-barnabashospitals-bronx-coronvirus (quoting Dr. Neil Calman, CEO and President for the Institute for
Family Health).
104. See Tucker, supra note 100; CUNY GRADUATE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH AND HEALTH POL’Y,
JOB LOSS IN NYC DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACTS HISPANICS AND LOWER INCOME CITY
RESIDENTS (2020), https://sph.cuny.edu/research/covid-19-tracking-survey/week-2/; see also See
Mironova & Waters, supra note 9.
105. See Richard A. Oppel et al., The Fullest Look Yet at the Racial Inequity of Coronavirus,
N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/05/us/coronaviruslatinos-african-americans-cdc-data.html (detailing the economic and health discrepancies COVID19 has based on race and socioeconomic class).
106. See Tucker, supra note 100.
107. See Stefanos Chen & Sydney Franklin, New York Rents Continue to Slide, While Sales
Rebound in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/14/realestate/
new-york-city-real-estate-market.html.
108. See New York City Residential Rental Market Report: January 2021, THE CORCORAN
GROUP
(Jan.
2021),
https://www.ecorcoran.com/uploaded_doc/Corcoran_January_2021_Rental_Market_Report.pdf;
see also Rent Report, February 2021: The State of the Rental Market, APARTMENTGUIDE (Feb. 24,
2021),
https://www.apartmentguide.com/blog/apartment-guide-annual-rent-report/#nationalaverage.
109. See Kaia Hubbard, New York City’s Falling Rents Reflect the Pain of COVID-19, U.S. NEWS
(Oct. 15, 2020) https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2020-10-15/new-york-citys-fallingrents-reflect-the-trauma-of-covid-19
110. Noah Manskar, Fewer New Yorkers Own Homes as Number Renting Grows, Figures Show,
PATCH (Jan. 25, 2018), https://patch.com/new-york/new-york-city/two-thirds-new-yorkers-nowrent-their-apartments-data-show.
111. Prashant Gopal, NYC Rental Market Pushed to Breaking Point by Tenant Debts,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 8, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-08
/coronavirus-moves-nyc-affordable-housing-crisis-to-breaking-point?sref=OH7mKQXK.
112. Id.
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States doubled in just one month, according to Moody’s Investors Service.113
Once again, the pandemic’s harm was not shared equally. While large real
estate lenders have been more willing to give property owners time to work
things out with their tenants,114 smaller lenders have been less patient, and
have initiated foreclosure proceedings in some instances. 115 This signals
trouble for large swaths of affordable housing providers who are
experiencing similar reductions in rental revenue116 but lack the cashflows to
stay afloat.117 The city itself is bracing for hundreds of millions of dollars in
delinquent property tax payments.118
In response to the eviction and foreclosure crises, the federal and New
York State government have taken significant measures to intervene.119 The
federal government enacted the CARES Act, which placed a nationwide
moratorium on evictions.120 Equally important were the stimulus payments
from the federal government, and the continued temporary expansion of
unemployment benefits.121 The State government enacted a 90-day eviction
moratorium,122 as well as the Tenant Safe Harbors Act, which protects from
eviction those renters who have suffered from the economic effects of the
pandemic.123 The New York City Department of Housing Preservation and
113. See JUN CHEN ET AL., CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19): AN EXAMINATION OF RECENT
DELINQUENCY TREND OF COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LOAN PORTFOLIOS (Moody’s Analytics,
2020).
114. See Matthew Goldstein, Worried Lenders Pounce on Landlords Unable to Pay Their Loans,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/business/commercial-landlordloan-foreclosure.html.
115. See, e.g., D2 Mark LLC v. OREI VI Investments LLC, 2020 WL 3432950, at *1–3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2020).
116. See Nam D. Pham et. al., Affordable Rental Housing Providers’ Expenses Increasing, Rent
Revenues Declining during Pandemic, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COALITION (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://hudnlha.com/wpcontent/uploads/documents/NLHA%20Housing%20Provider%20Impacts%20of%20COVID%20
Final%20Oct%202020.pdf.
117. Sadef Ali Kully, What Will COVID-19 Mean for Housing Development in NYC, CITY
LIMITS (Apr. 23, 2020), https://citylimits.org/2020/04/23/what-will-covid-19-mean-for-housingdevelopment-in-nyc/.
118. Robert Burnson & Chris Dolmetsch, N.Y. Landlords to Governor: Spare Us Taxes If We
Can’t Evict, BLOOMBERG (June 4, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-05/ny-landlords-to-governor-spare-us-taxes-if-we-can-t-evict.
119. Jason DeParle, Vast Federal Aid Has Capped Rise in Poverty, Studies Find, N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/21/us/politics/coronavirus-poverty.html.
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 9058 (The Cares Act’s protections, however, only extend to homes backed
by federal-secured mortgages and lacks any actual enforcement provision if a property owner were
to violate the tenant protections).
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 9021; 15 U.S.C. § 9023. See also, American Rescue Plan, H.R. 1319, 117th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2021).
122. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.70 (2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomosigns-executive-order-extending-moratorium-covid-related-commercial-evictions-0.
123. See S.8192B (Hoylman)/A.10290B (Dinowitz); see also Jonah Engel Bromwich & Ezra
Marcus, The Talk of Montauk, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
10/23/style/tenant-safe-harbor-act-hamptons.html (detailing the story of a wealthy Manhattanite
who refused to leave her Montauk rental home by invoking the Tenant Safe Harbor Act).
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Development (HPD) issued a request to the owners of city-funded buildings
with income-targeted housing to allocate 30% of their apartments for
homeless people.124 To do this, the city allocated additional rental voucher
money for HPD to pay the rent of formerly homeless individuals living in
these units.125 While there was no legal mechanism to require the owners’
compliance, the head of the New York State Association for Affordable
Housing promoted the program to all its members anyway. 126 These
measures have been effective in delaying widespread evictions,127 but they
fail to address the accruing debt low-income individuals face, and the
generational poverty that will continue to develop as a consequence.128 These
actions were intended to act as relief measures until the virus subsided and
the economy returned to health, 129 but the pandemic has continued, the
economy has not returned back to life, and millions remain unemployed and
underemployed. 130 As the shutdown continued through 2021, it becomes
clearer that renters, and predominantly people of color, were hit hardest by
the pandemic and will face significant challenges after the economy
recovers.131

124. See Sam Raskin, NYC asks affordable housing developers to house more homeless New
Yorkers, CURBED (Apr. 17, 2020).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Conor Dougherty, Millions of Evictions Are a Sharper Threat as Government Support
Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/07/business/economy/
housing-economy-eviction-renters.html (detailing the impending economic fallout once the
additional federal unemployment benefits run out, and the effects this will have on the housing
market); see also SARAH STEIN & NISHA SUTARIA, HOUSING POLICY IMPACT: FEDERAL EVICTION
PROTECTION COVERAGE AND THE NEED FOR BETTER DATA, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
ATLANTA (2020), https://www.frbatlanta.org/community-development/publications/partnersupdate/2020/covid-19-publications/200616-housing-policy-impact-federal-eviction-protectioncoverage-and-the-need-for-better-data.aspx.
128. See Gopal, supra note 111.
129. See Goldstein, supra note 114.
130. See Emily Cochrane, Jobless Benefits run out as Trump resists signing the relief bill, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/26/us/politics/trump-unemploymentcoronavirus-aid.html.
131. See Who are the renters in America?, USA FACTS (Feb. 25, 2021), https://usafacts.org/
articles/who-is-renting-in-america-cares-act/.

482

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 15

B. COVID-1 CURTAILS DEVELOPMENT
On top of long-standing issues like rising rents and a growing homeless
population, over the past few years, New York City has seen a decrease in
new housing construction and an increase in vacant housing units.132 This
decrease in construction has been worsened by the pandemic. On March 20,
2020, in response to the city’s initial outbreak, and to the large number of
worksites that failed to report outbreaks, 133 Governor Cuomo issued the
“New York State on PAUSE” executive order.134 The order put a hold on any
construction the city deemed “non-essential.” 135 Essential construction
included infrastructure projects, hospitals, homeless shelters, emergency
repairs, and affordable housing units. 136 In response to these restrictions,
some 900 appeals were filed with the Department of Buildings seeking
exemption from the ruling that deemed them nonessential.137 Then, on June
8, 2020, all of New York City’s construction sites reopened,138 and within
days, work was underway on approximately 32,000 nonessential projects.139
The combined effects of the recent downturn in construction and the
government’s shutdown produced an 8.5% decline in construction spending
and a 14% decrease in construction jobs from the previous three years.140 The
New York Building Congress’ Construction Outlook predicts that between
2020–2022 there will be 33% fewer new housing units constructed than
compared to 2017–2019.141
Although affordable housing was deemed essential, there is widespread
concern amongst developers about the economic viability of affordable

132. See generally NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BOARD, 2019 HOUSING SUPPLY REPORT
(2019) (detailing the rise in vacancies across New York City).
133. See Rosa Goldensohn, Construction Workers Still on Job Amid Coronavirus Concerns, THE
CITY (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/3/23/21210413/construction-workers-still-onjob-amid-coronavirus-concerns.
134. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.6 (2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/no-2026continuing-temporary-suspension-and-modification-laws-relating-disaster-emergency.
135. See Alex Benarroche, What New York considers “essential construction” during COVID19, LEVELSET (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.levelset.com/news/construction-essential-businessnew-york/.
136. Amy Plitt & Caroline Spivack, Which NYC construction projects are ‘essential’ right now?,
CURBED (Apr. 6, 2020), https://ny.curbed.com/2020/4/3/21206956/new-york-construction-sitesmap-coronavirus.
137. See C.J. Hughes, Construction in New York Limps Forward Despite Shutdown Order, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/05/realestate/coronavirus-construction
.html.
138. See Kim Slowey, New York City reopens nonessential construction work, CONSTRUCTION
DIVE (June 8, 2020), https://www.constructiondive.com/news/new-york-city-reopens-nonessential
-construction-work/579276/.
139. Id.
140. See NEW YORK BUILDING CONGRESS, 2020-2022 NEW YORK CITY CONSTRUCTION
OUTLOOK (2020).
141. Id.
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housing development. 142 One cause of concern for affordable housing
developers was the value of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC).
The LIHTC program provides a reduction in federal income tax liability for
investors in rental housing that serves low and very low-income
households. 143 The IRS allocates tax credits to a developer based on the
percentage of units that are affordable within a new development. 144 The
developer is then able to sell these tax credits to corporate investors to raise
the equity that is used towards constructing the project.145 As a result of a tax
credit investment, investors usually garner a significant percentage of equity
in the project that helps finance the project while also obtaining a reduction
in their federal income taxes. 146 Despite the value of these tax credits
dropping precipitously in the 2008 recession, experts indicate that their value
has stayed strong during the pandemic.147 Developers hope this will keep the
private sector’s interest in affordable housing development at the same
heights as seen in 2019.
C. SURROUNDING SUBURBS EXPERIENCE A HOUSING BOOM
There is concern about the pandemic’s segregating effect on New York
City’s suburbs as well. Since the onset of the pandemic, there has been a
housing boom in the suburbs surrounding New York City.148 Despite 50% of
Americans believing it is a bad time to purchase a house, 149 record-low
interest rates have driven Americans with economic means to spread out into
the suburbs and avoid urban congestion. 150 While signed sales contracts for
condos and co-ops in New York City fell 60% in 2020 from a year earlier, 151
deals for single-family homes doubled in Westchester County and Fairfield

142. See, e.g., Jennifer Castenson, The Pandemic Threatens the Already Vulnerable Affordable
Housing Crisis, FORBES (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennifercastenson/2020/
10/12/the-pandemic-threatens-the-already-vulnerable-affordable-housingcrisis/?sh=dd2652c393d3.
143. FURMAN CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, THE EFFECTS OF THE LOW-INCOME
HOUSING TAX CREDIT (2017).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See Beth Mattson-Teig, The LIHTC Market Weathers COVID-19 Pressures, NAT’L REAL
EST. INV. (June 1, 2020), https://www.nreionline.com/investment/lihtc-market-weathers-covid-19pressures.
148. See, e.g., Prashant Gopal & John Gittelsohn, Urban Exiles are Fueling a Suburban Housing
Boom Across the U.S., BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2020-08-20/covid-pandemic-fuels-u-s-housing-boom-as-urbanites-swarmsuburbs?sref=OH7mKQXK.
149. Jeffrey M. Jones, New Low in U.S. Say It Is a Good Time to Buy a House, GALLUP (Apr. 24,
2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/309215/new-low-say-good-time-buy-house.aspx.
150. See Gopal & Gittelsohn, supra note 148.
151. Oshrat Carmiel, Manhattan Lags With Suburban Shift Fueling Region’s Home Sales,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-06/manhattanlags-with-suburban-shift-fueling-region-s-home-sales?sref=OH7mKQXK.
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County, Connecticut.152 The increased demand is causing significant supply
shortages for builders and has resulted in price increases in new
developments.153 This increased demand drives home prices up and further
prevents low-income families from being able to purchase these singlefamily homes.154 In fact, the majority of New Yorkers who fled were from
the city’s wealthiest neighborhoods, with more than half of the residents from
these neighborhoods being white and earning over $100,000 annually.155 The
mass exodus and resultant loss of high-income taxpayers, which could
exacerbate ballooning state and city budget holes, caused New York
lawmakers to panic.156
In an increasingly diversifying city,157 this widespread migration out of
the city further isolates poverty and entrenches New York’s alreadysegregated suburban landscape. 158 As wealthy residents leave New York
City, they take significant portions of their tax revenue with them. The
resulting reduction in the city’s revenue will have dramatic effects on New
York’s public housing stock.159 Combined with the disproportionate toll of
COVID-19 on the Black community,160 there is concern that New York’s

152. See Gopal & Gittelsohn, supra note 148.
153. See Prashant Gopal, U.S. Housing Boom Threatened by Short Supply of Homes to Buy,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-25/housingboom-in-u-s-threatened-by-shortage-of-available-homes?sref=OH7mKQXK.
154. Id.
155. See Kevin Quealy, The Richest Neighborhoods Emptied Out Most as Coronavirus Hit New
York
City,
N.Y. TIMES,
May
15,
2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2020/05/15/upshot/who-left-new-york-coronavirus.html; MICHAEL HENDRIX, A SURVEY OF NEW
YORK CITY’S HIGH-INCOME EARNERS: THE FUTURE OF WORK AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE,
MANHATTAN-INSTITUTE (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/survey-nyc-highincome-earners-future-work-and-quality-life (surveying New York City residents to find out who
fled, and combining these analytics with racial and economic breakdowns of neighborhoods based
on previous censuses).
156. See Luis Ferré-Sadurní & Jesse McKinley, Tax the Ultrarich? Cuomo Resists, Even With a
$14 Billion Budget Gap, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/09/07/nyregion/wealth-tax-budget-billionaires.html.
157. WILLIAM H. FREY, THE NATION IS DIVERSIFYING EVEN FASTER THAN PREDICTED,
BROOKINGS INST. (July 1, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/new-census-data-shows-thenation-is-diversifying-even-faster-than-predicted/ (detailing the diversification of America,
particularly in cities like New York City and Los Angeles).
158. See BEEN, supra note 1; see also Talmon Joseph Smith, New York is Dead … to Whom?
We’ve Seen New York’s White Flight Before, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2020/08/new-york-dead-to-whom/615673/.
159. See Dana Rubinstein, ‘We’re at War’: New York City Faces a Financial Abyss, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/28/nyregion/nyc-budget-coronavirus.html
(detailing the economic windfall of the pandemic, and the resulting loss in personal tax revenue
from the evacuation of wealthy residents).
160. See Tucker, supra note 105; CUNY GRADUATE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH AND HEALTH POL’Y,
WORKING TO ADDRESS COVID-19 (2020), https://sph.cuny.edu/research/covid-19-trackingsurvey/september/.
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housing will become further segregated. 161 Homeownership amongst the
Black community was already on the decline. 162 Thus, the widespread
housing inequities and segregation that existed in New York and New York
City have been both highlighted and worsened by the pandemic.
III. APPROACHES OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Due to the disparate impact of COVID-19 on people of color, and the
exacerbating effects it has had on inequality and racial segregation, New
York State is being forced to confront its history of segregation. In response
to the inequitable impact, the State must implement wide-ranging,
ameliorative legislation that responds to the housing crisis before it becomes
unsustainable. In considering what measures to take, the State should look to
other jurisdictions across the United States that have been successful in
combatting the housing crisis.
A. ACCESSORY DWELLING UNIT DEVELOPMENT
Some municipalities have attempted to increase their housing supply
through the creation of accessory dwelling units (ADUs), with some states
loosening regulatory restrictions on their construction, and others offering
financial assistance to encourage their development. 163 An ADU is a
separate, self-contained housing unit that is located on the property of a
single-family home but cannot be sold separately from the main structure.164
These additional units make housing more affordable by providing property
owners with the income needed to maintain their residence, pay their
mortgage,165 and, in some instances, enable them to live in neighborhoods
with better schools and better access to quality healthcare. 166 In Portland,

161. Connor Maxwell, The Coronavirus Crisis is Worsening Racial Inequality, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (June 10, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2020/06/10/
486095/coronavirus-crisis-worsening-racial-inequality/.
162. Laurie Goodman, Jun Zhu & Rolf Pendall, Are gains in black homeownership history?, URB.
INST. (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/are-gains-black-homeownership-history.
163. See Infranca, supra note 20 (citing Margaret Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, A Room of
One’s Own? Accessory Dwelling Unit Reforms and Local Parochialism, 45 The Urb. Law. 519,
535 (2013) (discussing local and state efforts around ADU development)).
164. See generally John Infranca, Housing Changing Households: Regulatory Changes for
Micro-Units and Accessory Dwelling Units, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 53 (2014) (detailing the
growth in popularity of ADUs, and the legislative changes making this growth possible).
165. Kathleen Pender, New California Housing Laws Make Granny Units Easier to Build, S.F.
CHRON. (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/New-California-housing-lawsmake-granny-units-10688483.php (detailing the broad-scale, economic benefits low- and moderateincome households experience when allowed to maintain an additional dwelling unit on their singlefamily parcel).
166. See Infranca, supra note 20 (comparing the educational benefits derived from an increase in
affordable housing development that is experienced both by the low-income students in these
developments, and the region as a whole); see also Keith Ihlanfeldt & Tom Mayock, Affordable
Housing and the Socioeconomic Integration of Elementary Schools, 58 J. OF REAL ESTATE FIN. &
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Oregon, the city previously had ownership and setback requirements for
ADUs to be developed. 167 Portland also required “dedicated off-street
parking.”168 These requirements hindered any widespread ADU development
and restricted ADUs to properties with the space to construct new parking
spots.169 After Portland eliminated these requirements,170 and waived various
filing and development fees, 171 it saw a significant increase in ADU
development.172 In 2016, 615 new ADUs were issued permits which is an
increase from eighty-six in 2010. 173 By implementing these policies and
removing some of these procedural hurdles, Portland has succeeded in
encouraging ADU development as one method for combatting its housing
crisis.
Other municipalities witnessed the success of Portland’s ADU program
and implemented their own ADU initiatives.174 Many state governments limit
the ability of local governments to prevent ADU development. 175 For
example, the California State Legislature passed two new laws in 2016 that

ECON. 567 (July 9, 2017) (focusing on the effects on a school from an influx of low-income
students).
167. See Bob Young, Big Interest in Little Backyard Houses: Will Seattle Ease the Rules?,
SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/city-rulesamong-big-obstacles-for-little-houses/.
168. See Infranca, supra note 25, at 859. The requirement of “dedicated off-street parking” means
that to construct an ADU, a property owner must construct additional parking space in their
driveway. This requirement is in response to opposition from existing residents of a neighborhood,
who often fear competition for on-street parking.
169. See Infranca, Housing Changing Households, supra note 164. This creates both a special
and financial burden for individuals looking to develop an ADU and further restricts these beneficial
developments to a specific class of homeowner.
170. Steve Law, Fee Waiver for New Accessory Dwelling Units Fixed into Law, but There’s a
Fee to Get It, PORTLAND TRIB. (June 27, 2018), https://pamplinmedia.com/sl/399497-294774-feewaiver-for-new-accessory-dwellingunits-fixed-into-law-but-theres-a-fee-to-get-it.
171. Portland City Council, Resolution No. Substitute 37353 (adopted May 2, 2018),
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/auditor/article/682997.
172. See Kim Moore, By the Numbers: Portland’s Residential Housing Boom, OR. BUS. (Nov.
14,
2017),
https://www.oregonbusiness.com/article/real-estate/item/18092-by-the-numbersportlands-residential-housing-boom
173. The Ascent of ADUs in Portland, ACCESSORYDWELLINGS.ORG (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://accessorydwellings.org/2017/02/27/the-ascension-of-adus-in-portland/; See Infranca, supra
note 20, at 859 (highlighting the increase of ADU permit applications in Portland since the
restrictions were eased).
174. See Infranca, supra note 20, at 860–869 (discussing California, Vermont, Washington and
Oregon’s efforts to mirror Portland’s ADU program); see also Jeff Ostrowski, Coronavirus sparks
renewed interest in granny flats, in-law suites, THE OKLAHOMAN (Aug. 8, 2020), https://
oklahoman.com/article/5668406/coronavirus-sparks-renewed-interest-in-granny-flats-in-lawsuites.
175. See Pender, supra note 165 (explaining that any California cities or counties that have not
adopted or amended a local ordinance that complies with the new, more permissive state ADU law
will have to follow the state law until they approve a compliant one); see also Margaret Brinig &
Nicole Stelle Garnett, A Room of One’s Own? Accessory Dwelling Unit Reforms and Local
Parochialism, 45 THE URB. LAW. 519-524 (2013).
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limit the extent to which localities can regulate ADUs.176 One of the laws
requires local governments to approve one ADU “per single-family lot if the
unit is contained within the existing space of a single-family residence or
accessory structure, has independent exterior access from the existing
residence, and the side and rear setbacks are sufficient for fire safety.”177 The
law also forbids municipalities from requiring parking if the ADU is located
within one half-mile of public transit, one block from a car share vehicle, part
of the existing primary residence or an existing accessory structure, located
in a historic district, or if on-street parking permits are required but not
offered to the ADU occupant. 178 Absent a broad scale rezoning, and
subsequent demolition of single-family parcels, ADU development provides
a plausible mechanism for increasing density in the suburbs of New York.
B. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN THE HOUSING MARKET: THE
MOUNT LAUREL DOCTRINE
Another avenue to combat the housing crisis comes from New Jersey’s
Mount Laurel doctrine which developed over the course of two judicial
decisions between 1975 and 1983, intended to promote affordable housing
development across the state.179 Specifically, the doctrine gives developers
the ability to appeal a local government’s rejection of their proposed
development. 180 In the first of these judicial decisions, Mount Laurel
Township, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that, because zoning powers
are delegated by the state to local authorities, courts must examine the effects
of a municipalities’ zoning ordinance on all the state’s citizens, rather than
those within “the borders of the particular municipality.” 181 This ruling
required local municipalities to develop, through their land-use regulations,
low and moderate-income housing to meet the “present and prospective
regional need.”182 In the past, local governments used this language to reject
proposed developments based on the potential impositions on traffic
congestion and available street parking. 183 Following this decision, local
municipalities were required to look to the whole region’s housing needs.184
Additionally, the decision encouraged the local legislature to strike down

176. See Cal. S.B. 1069, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); see also A.B. 2299, 2015–2016
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
177. See Cal. S.B. 1069 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.2(f)).
178. See Infranca, supra note 20, at 862 (quoting Cal. S.B. 1069 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE
§65852.2(e)).
179. John M. Payne, Fairly Sharing Affordable Housing Obligations: The Mount Laurel Matrix,
22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 365 (2001).
180. See Robert C. Holmes, The Clash of Home Rule and Affordable Housing: The Mount Laurel
Story Continues, 12 UNIV. CONN. L. REV. 325 (2018).
181. S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 336 A.2d 713, 726 (N.J. 1975).
182. Id. at 713.
183. See Infranca, supra note 20 at 839, 849.
184. See S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 336 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. 1975).
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local zoning regulations that were excluding new, denser developments by
citing this “regional need” for housing.185
These doctrines had immense benefits both for the individuals in the
affordable developments, and the communities as a whole. Studies have
found that the residents of Mount Laurel’s affordable housing developments
have “higher rates of employment and family income and significantly lower
rates of welfare dependency.”186 Studies also found that the developments did
not have a deleterious effect on property values and that taxes in the area did
not go up.187 Despite the evident benefits that integrated housing has provided
its residents, New Jersey’s elected branches found numerous creative ways
to assist local governments in avoiding, or at least minimizing, their housing
obligations under the law. 188 Furthermore, following Mount Laurel II in
1983, there was a prolonged period of inaction by the judiciary during which
the courts failed to enforce the housing requirements on local
municipalities. 189 This period of inaction similarly allowed New Jersey’s
Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) to avoid its Mount Laurel
obligations.190
Recently, New Jersey courts have again become proactive in promoting
municipalities’ fair housing obligations. In 2011, the Appellate Division
dismissed the COAH’s willingness to allow municipalities to determine their
own fair housing obligations.191 In rejecting the COAH’s practice, the court
again asserted that land-use regulations that conflict with the general,
regional welfare are unconstitutional.192 Frustrated by local municipalities’
failure to assist with the region’s housing needs, as well as the legislature’s
failure to enforce their fair housing obligations, the New York courts should
follow the lead of the New Jersey courts and enforce the obligations
themselves.193

185. S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 456 A.2d 390, 413–15 (N.J. 1983).
186. See Editorial, The Mount Laurel Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/opinion/the-mount-laurel-doctrine.html (quoting Douglas S.
Massey, et. al., CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND
SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB (Princeton Review, 2013)).
187. See Editorial, The Mount Laurel Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.
nytimes.com/2013/01/29/opinion/the-mount-laurel-doctrine.html.
188. See Holmes, supra note 180, at 349–56.
189. Id. at 348, 358.
190. Id. at 358.
191. Id. at 356–58 (discussing In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 15 A.3d 325, 456 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)).
192. Id. at 360.
193. See Infranca, supra note 20, at 840–41 (citing to In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97,
110 A.3d at 42).
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C. CALIFORNIA’S RECENT STATEWIDE EFFORTS
In California, numerous municipalities have implemented measures to
prevent developers from building new units within their jurisdictions.194 This
has forced city governments and Governor Gavin Newsom to implement
measures to ameliorate what has become one of the most precarious housing
situations in the country in ways that voters are not directly authorizing.195 In
Los Angeles, Mayor Eric Garcetti began the Transit Oriented Communities
Program.196 The program allows developers to upzone neighborhoods near
major bus and train lines and incentivizes the inclusion of affordable units in
the developments through tax breaks. 197 The goal is to reduce carbon
emissions by encouraging public transit use while simultaneously tackling
Los Angeles’ housing shortage.198 In July 2018, Los Angeles’ City Council
approved the Exposition Corridor Transit Neighborhood Plan, which would
have built between 4,000–6,000 new housing units along five separate E Line
transit stations. 199 However, over a year later, following a lawsuit by a
community-based, anti-development non-profit, 200 not a single one of these
units has been built.201
California has also taken steps at the state level. In early 2020, the
California State Legislature proposed SB-50 which would: (1) increase
allowable building heights statewide to five stories near major public transit
stops, and (2) allow multifamily apartments on most properties.202 While the
bill ultimately failed, 203 it is indicative of the type of large-scale projects
needed to address the affordability crisis. One year prior, Governor Newsom
threatened to deny transportation funding to cities that failed to satisfy
longer-term housing quotas.204 In its own right, New York could take similar
drastic action but has instead taken a hands-off approach to the local
municipalities and smaller cities surrounding New York City.
194. Id. at 860–866 (detailing the efforts of local municipalities to restrict new development, and
the statewide efforts to bypass these restrictions).
195. See Alissa Walker, The real reason California’s upzoning bill failed, CURBED (Feb. 7,
2020), https://archive.curbed.com/2020/2/7/21125100/sb-50-california-bill-fail.
196. See Jarrett Hill, ‘Fix the City’ sues LA over program to build housing near transit hubs,
KCRW: GREATER L.A. (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.kcrw.com/news/shows/greater-la/will-las-furban-spread-statewide/fix-the-city-sues-la-over-program-to-build-housing-near-transit-hubs.
197. See Bianca Barragan, LA sued over plan to add density along Expo Line, CURBED (Oct. 30,
2018), https://la.curbed.com/2018/10/30/18043732/expo-line-lawsuit-transit-density.
198. See Jenna Chandler, California’s transit density bill is back. What would it do to Los
Angeles?, CURBED (Jan. 7, 2020), https://la.curbed.com/2020/1/7/21054886/california-transitdensity-bill-50.
199. See Barragan, supra note 197.
200. See Hill, supra note 196; see also Barragan, supra note 197.
201. See Walker, supra note 195.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Matt Levin, It’s a Big Deal: Newsom’s Housing Budget Explained, MERCURY NEWS (Jan.
14, 2019), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/01/13/its-a-big-deal-newsoms-housing-budgetexplained/.
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D. ZONING AUTHORITY: STATE VS. LOCAL
Thirteen states have statutes or regulations that either expressly authorize
inclusionary zoning or imply such authority by granting states broad powers
to promote affordable housing. 205 The ability to implement inclusionary
zoning policies in these states largely depends on state legislatures’
willingness to enact zoning laws that conflict with local municipalities’
policies and depends on the “home rule” powers that the municipalities
possess.206 “Home rule” describes the relationship between state and local
government and the extent to which a state government delegates its powers
to local governments.207 In Connecticut, for example, municipalities derive
their powers from the state legislature and are thus able to have these powers
removed.208
New York State, conversely, has an “incentive zoning” statute that
enables local planning and zoning commissions to provide incentives to
developers but fails to require municipalities to provide these incentives.209
By failing to require these developments, New York has allowed local
municipalities to reject affordable housing proposals and zoning changes.210
Furthermore, New York is a limited “home rule” state, with local
municipalities holding structural and functional powers under the New York
State Constitution which explicitly limits the legislature’s ability to interfere
with local affairs.211 To effectively combat its housing crisis, New York State
must look to the authority other states’ constitutions grant to their
legislatures, and New York’s state courts must continue to examine
restrictive zoning regulations in relation to the regional housing needs, as
they have in the past.212

205. Timothy S. Hollister et al., National Survey of Statutory Authority and Practical
Considerations for the Implementation of Inclusionary Zoning Ordinances, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS, June 2007, at 2.
206. See Holmes, supra note 180, at 325 (2018).
207. Id. at 325–29 (2018).
208. Timothy S. Hollister et al., National Survey of Statutory Authority and Practical
Considerations for the Implementation of Inclusionary Zoning Ordinances, NAT’L ASS’N HOME
BUILDERS (June 2007), https://inclusionaryhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Hollister-etal.-2007-National-Survey-of-Statutory-Authority-and-Practic.pdf
(Two
municipalities
in
Connecticut have adopted inclusionary zoning ordinances, with Stamford’s ordinance recently
being amended to allow several new multi-family developments in its downtown area).
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Lizabeth Cohen, The Doomed 1970’s Plan to Desegregate New York’s Suburbs,
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-1021/why-fair-share-housing-failed-in-1970s-suburbia.
211. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1, 2.
212. See, e.g., Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242-243 (N.Y. 1975) (finding
that any party may challenge a local zoning ordinance because it fails to account for the regional
housing needs for multi-family housing development); see also, Matter of City of Rochester, 530
N.E.2d 202 (N.Y. 1988) (finding that a county’s interest in development outweighs a local
municipality’s interest in restricting such development).
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IV. THE IDEAL TIME TO REMEDY LONG-STANDING
INE UITIES IN HOUSING
In the wake of the pandemic’s economic devastation and the modernday, pandemic-driven white flight to the suburbs, New York State must
intervene in its housing market in a radical way. The pandemic’s
disproportionate impact on the black community shows that the need is not
just to override challenges from neighborhood coalitions and historic
preservation, but to address the racial segregation that serves as the
foundation of New York State’s housing infrastructure. The State must
expand its housing authority to allow New York City developers to build
beyond the confines of New York City and into the nearby suburbs. Similar
to how the federal government took drastic action in the provision and
financing of housing during the Great Depression, New York must respond
to the pandemic’s effects on the housing market by expanding its authority
over local municipalities, eliminating procedural hurdles to new
developments, and subsidizing localities willing to cooperate. Crucially, the
State must do this while keeping in mind the segregating policies that
permeated the federal government’s approach during the Great Depression.
New York must seize the unique moment that the pandemic has created to
remedy the long-standing segregation and housing inequality in New York
State.
A. AMEND THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION
The first step the State must take is to amend the New York State
Constitution and expand its authority by limiting local municipalities’ “home
rule” authority. The New York State Constitution can be amended either by
proposing an amendment in the legislature or through a convention, both of
which require voter approval.213 A State Constitutional Convention has not
occurred since 1967,214 and therefore a single amendment would likely be the
appropriate route. New York State must amend Article IX of the New York
State Constitution to further establish itself as a “Dillon’s Rule” state,215 and
to limit municipalities’ “home rule” powers. The “Dillon Rule” is derived
from an 1868 decision issued by Judge John Dillon, which asserts that a
municipal government may engage in activities only if it is specifically
sanctioned by the State government. 216 While New York is considered a
“Dillon’s Rule” state, it has failed to exercise this authority over the housing
decisions of local municipalities’ governments. Currently, a large percentage

213. See Gerald Benjamin, The New York State Constitution: A Briefing Book, TEMPORARY
STATE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 57, 64–66, 73 (1994).
214. See Richard I. Nunez, New York State Constitutional Reform – Past Political Battles in
Constitutional Language, 10 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 366, 373 (1968).
215. N.Y. CONST. art. IX.
216. See Holmes, supra note 180, at 329–330.
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of New York State’s counties are exclusively zoned for single-family use and
effectively use this zoning to restrict new developments.217 For example, in
2018 Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester County permitted the development
of just 3,658 new units for a combined population of 3.8 million people.218
This lack of development restricts much-needed housing to the confines of
New York City, and is indicative of the authority municipalities in these
counties possess over the region’s housing needs.
If New York succeeds in amending its constitution, it will be able to use
cases like Anti-Discrimination Center and Mhany Management in Nassau
and Westchester counties similar to how New Jersey used the Mount Laurel
decisions. 219 While the practical effect of these decisions by the state
judiciary remains questionable, 220 New York must continue to require
municipalities’ compliance with their fair housing obligations. Additionally,
the court should use these decisions similar to how New Jersey courts used
the Mount Laurel doctrine and must overturn any local zoning regulations
having a deleterious effect on the general welfare of the state. Like the
Second Circuit in Anti-Discrimination Center, New York State could
overturn any local municipality’s rejection of a proposed affordable housing
development through an injunction, by citing to the regional housing needs
and the greater welfare of the state. By establishing the precedent that these
obligations will be enforced by the state courts, local governments will be
forced to become proactive in meeting their fair housing obligations.
B. NEW YORK STATE’S ADU DEVELOPMENT
Amending the New York State Constitution will also allow the
legislature to alter any overly burdensome ADU requirements imposed by
many municipalities. There have been recent steps towards reducing the
procedural hurdles that impede ADU development in places like Nassau and
Westchester County.221 For instance, in 2019, the Nassau County Board of

217. See Alanna Browdy & Arvind Sindhwani, Our Region Needs More Housing: End Single
Family Zoning, REGIONAL PLAN ASS’N (2019), https://rpa.org/latest/lab/our-region-needs-morehousing-end-single-family-zoning.
218. See Eric Kober, And You, New York?, CITY-JOURNAL (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.cityjournal.org/housing-accessory-dwelling-units.
219. See Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that a
restrictive zoning ordinance is in violation of the Federal Housing Authority, and using this to
enforce the development of affordable housing); see also U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of
Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester Cty., N.Y., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
220. Editorial, Towns That Defy Fair-Housing Law, N.Y. TIMES, (July 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/opinion/towns-that-defy-fair-housing-law.html (quoting the
Anti-Discrimination Center’s executive director as saying that, despite the 750 homes being built,
exclusionary zoning remains a problem in Westchester, and that many of the communities failed to
enforce the consent decree’s requirements).
221. See Suanne Thamm, Nassau County adopts accessory dwelling regulations, FERNANDINA
OBSERVER (Mar. 14, 2019), https://fernandinaobserver.com/county-news/nassau-county-adoptsaccessory-dwelling-regulations/.
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County Commissioners voted to approve changes to the County Land
Development Code (LDC) that would allow ADUs as a by-right use in any
residentially-zoned district in Nassau County.222 These measures, however,
have not sparked the ADU boom seen in Portland, Oregon, and California.
While they indicate a step towards easing restrictions, there are procedural
and substantive requirements that still hinder the efficacy of these changes.
Under the current LDC requirements, ADUs may only be used by family
members, friends or caretakers, unless the main home on the parcel carries
an active homestead exemption through the County Property Appraiser.223
Furthermore, many municipalities in Nassau and Westchester County still
impose off-street parking requirements. 224 Lastly, to construct an ADU, there
is a complex array of paperwork to be submitted to the relevant county
building department.225
New York must follow the leads of Portland and California in eliminating
a number of these hurdles that hinder ADU development throughout the
State. For instance, similar to both Portland and California, New York State
should limit municipalities’ ability to impose parking requirements which
add to the prospective construction costs for ADUs. The State could do this
by allowing any ADU development so long as the newly constructed ADU
is located within one half-mile of public transit, one block from a car share
vehicle, is part of an already-existing structure, or is located in a historic
district. While the State should expect to receive pushback from local
municipalities and their constituents, they could combat this pushback by
explicitly limiting the extent to which localities can regulate ADUs, similar
to Portland’s ADU laws.
If unable to pass an amendment of this import, New York State may also
encourage ADU development by limiting the funding and subsidization of its
public transit systems like the Long Island Railroad (LIRR). By some
accounts, the LIRR is the most heavily subsidized of New York City’s three
major transit systems.226 While taxes from both Nassau and Suffolk county
contribute to covering the LIRR’s operating costs, the majority of the
subsidies come from taxes collected by the remainder of the New York City
area.227 Similar to California’s proposal to withhold transportation funding,
New York can restrict the distribution of State funds until local governments
can establish how they are addressing the region’s housing needs.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See Sabrina Sucato, Granny Pods Spark Controversy as Demand for Affordable Housing
Continues, HUDSON VALLEY MAGAZINE (Dec. 27, 2018), https://hvmag.com/life-style/grannypods-spark-controversy-as-demand-for-affordable-housing-continues/.
225. See Thamm, supra note 221.
226. See Jim Brennan, LIRR’s Heavy Subsidies and the Coming Debate over MTA Funding,
GOTHAM GAZETTE (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.gothamgazette.com/letters/130-opinion/8182-lirrs-heavy-subsidies-and-the-coming-debate-over-mta-funding.
227. Id.
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Specifically, until Nassau and Suffolk counties can establish how they are
affirmatively furthering fair housing in accordance with its Fair Housing Act
obligations, New York State should restrict the financial assistance it offers
to these suburbs.
These ADU proposals are not limited to the suburbs either; about 15% of
New York City’s residential land is zoned for single-family homes,
particularly in Queens and Staten Island.228 By offering a myriad of routes
for homeowners to avoid the requirement of new, off-street parking to build
an ADU, New York State could see growth in accessory dwelling structures
similar to Portland.
C. THE RESPONSE IN NEW YORK CITY
In August 2020, the city’s six-month Uniform Land Use Review
Procedure (ULURP) relaunched virtually, after being shut down in March
because of the pandemic. 229 ULURP is the process by which a developer
proposes to build something that is outside an area’s particular zoning
designation. 230 The ULURP process is lengthy and complex and requires
approval from the Department of City Planning (DCP), the City Planning
Commission, and the City Council, and involves the advisory opinions of
local community boards and the borough president. 231 In relaunching
ULURP, the DCP announced it will focus its new proposals on city-backed
affordable housing, climate-resilient infrastructure, and economic recovery
projects.232
By prioritizing affordable housing and infrastructure, the city is
attempting to lay the groundwork for its recovery over the long run.233 In
doing so, the city must avoid continuing to upzone communities of color. In
the past, ULURP developed a reputation for excluding residents, particularly
those in low-income communities of color, who often do not have the time
or resources to attend the public hearings. 234 Since it is these same
228. See Kober, supra note 218.
229. See Caroline Spivack, As Rezoning Process Relaunches, New York Seeks to “Dismantle”
Inequity, CURBED (July 30, 2020), https://ny.curbed.com/2020/7/30/21346424/new-york-city-landuse-review-ulurp-equity [hereinafter Rezoning Process Relaunches]
230. See Caroline Spivack, What is ULURP, and why should I care? NYC’s land-use review
process, explained, CURBED (Jan. 22, 2020), https://ny.curbed.com/2020/1/22/21073049/nyczoning-ulurp-land-use-review-city-council [hereinafter What is ULURP] (detailing the processes
and procedural requirements to garner ULURP approval).
231. See id.
232. See Rezoning Process Relaunches, supra note 229; see also, DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING,
WHAT IS NYC ENGAGE?, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nycengage/index.page (attempting to foster
public participation in the ULURP process).
233. See Rezoning Process Relaunches, supra note 229; see also Alexandra Lange, Is America’s
densest
city
ready
to
make
room?,
CURBED
(Sept.
12,
2018),
https://ny.curbed.com/2018/9/12/17841844/downtown-brooklyn-80-flatbush-building-yimby
(discussing the difficulties affordable housing developers face when confronted by borough officials
and community boards).
234. See Rezoning Process Relaunches, supra note 229.
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communities that were hit hardest by the pandemic, 235 the DCP must
prioritize racial equity in any new developments, and take steps to ensure that
a diverse set of voices are heard throughout the planning process. In what
will likely be the last major rezoning of the De Blasio Administration, New
York is in the process of upzoning the Gowanus waterfront to develop a
mixture of new housing and green infrastructure. 236 The eighty-block
development plan in Gowanus is expected to create 8,200 new apartments by
2035, roughly a third of which will be set aside as affordable units.237 Despite
New York announcing its investments would be focused on areas hardest hit
by COVID-19, Gowanus was not disproportionately affected by the
pandemic. 238 Despite this, the decision to rezone Gowanus has been
championed by those who felt New York City’s rezonings were too often
occurring in low-income communities of color.239 Historically, the land-use
review process has been accused of excluding these communities, who lack
the time and resources to attend the ULURP public hearings.240 By rezoning
a middle-income, majority-white neighborhood, ULURP is attempting to
bring affordable housing to neighborhoods that already have the
infrastructure needed to develop a broad array of economic opportunities.241
In the future, the city must continue to look to this project as a model for
sustainable rezonings.
New York City is at a unique political moment, having put its land-use
review process on hold for months, during which the city seemed to
acknowledge the structural racism and land-use decisions that have
segregated New York City.249 By working to incorporate this understanding
into the ULURP process, the city has the chance to implement changes to the
inequitable, unsustainable housing situation we currently have.
CONCLUSION
COVID-19 and the government-imposed shutdown have caused
significant disruption and economic uncertainty for the real estate industry.
235. See Kolata, supra note 101.
236. See Rezoning Process Relaunches, supra note 229 (detailing the various benefits the
Gowanus neighborhood will receive from new development).
237. Caroline Spivack, City says Gowanus rezoning will create 8,200 new apartments, CURBED
(Mar. 28, 2019), https://ny.curbed.com/2019/3/28/18285233/dcp-gowanus-brooklyn-rezoningcreate-8200-apartments.
238. See Rezoning Process Relaunches, supra note 229.
239. See Rezoning Process Relaunches, supra note 229; see also Caroline Spivack, How NYC
rezonings spur ‘racialized displacement’ throughout the city, CURBED (Dec. 5, 2019),
https://ny.curbed.com/2019/12/5/20995175/nyc-rezonings-racial-displacement-jumaane-williams
[hereinafter How NYC rezonings spur] (detailing the pernicious effects of zoning, and the frequency
with which low-income communities of color are the ones targeted for rezoning).
240. See How NYC rezonings spur, supra note 239; see also Rezoning Process Relaunches, supra
note 229.
241. See Rezoning Process Relaunches, supra note 229.
249
See How NYC rezonings spur, supra note 239.
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The most effective way to combat these disruptions will be a broad-scale,
multi-faceted plan at the federal, state, and local levels. While there have been
attempts to protect the interests of the real estate industry, the government
can and must do better. The government must provide financial and
regulatory help to combat the current housing crisis and work to remedy
broad-scale inequities in housing.
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